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homophily in the contact network structure induces different career choices for 
individuals from different social groups. This further translates into stable occupational 
segregation equilibria in the labor market. We derive the conditions for wage and 
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Occupational segregation between various social groups is an enduring and pervasive phe-
nomenon, with important implications for the labor market. Richard Posner recently pointed
out that \a glance of the composition of di®erent occupations shows that in many of them,
particularly racial, ethnic, and religious groups, along with one or the other sex and even groups
de¯ned by sexual orientation (heterosexual vs. homosexual), are disproportionately present or
absent"1. There are countless empirical studies within sociology and economics that document
the extent of occupational segregation. Most studies investigating the causes of occupational
segregation agree that 'classical' theories such as taste or statistical discrimination by employers
cannot alone explain occupational disparities and their remarkable persistence. While several
meritorious alternative theories were to date considered, scientists with long-standing interest
in the area, such as Kenneth Arrow (1998), particularly referred to modeling the social network
interactions as a very promising avenue for further research in this context.
In this paper we consider therefore a simple social interactions model in order to investigate
the network channel leading to occupational segregation and wage inequality in the labor mar-
ket. We construct a four-stage model of occupational segregation between two homogeneous,
exogenously given, mutually exclusive social groups acting in a two-job labor market. In the
¯rst stage each individual chooses one of two specialized educations to become a worker. In
the second stage individuals randomly form \friendship" ties with other individuals, with a ten-
dency to form relatively more ties with members of the same social group, what is known in
the literature as \(inbreeding) homophily", \inbreeding bias" or "assortative matching".2 In the
third stage workers use their networks of friendship contacts to search for jobs. In the fourth
stage workers earn a wage and spend their income on a single consumption good.
We obtain the following results. First, and not surprisingly, we show that with inbreeding
homophily within social groups, a complete polarization in terms of occupations across the two
groups arises as a stable equilibrium outcome. This result follows from standard arguments on
network e®ects. If a group is completely segregated and specialized in one type of job, then each
1The quote is from a post in \The Becker-Posner Blog", see http://www.becker-posner-blog.com. Posner goes
on by giving a clear-cut example of gender occupational segregation: \a much higher percentage of biologists than
of physicists are women, and at least one branch of biology, primatology, appears to be dominated by female
scientists. It seems unlikely that all sex-related di®erences in occupational choice are due to discrimination"
2Homophily measures the relative frequency of within-group versus between-group friendships. There exists
inbreeding homophily or an inbreeding bias if the group's homophily is higher than what would have been expected
if friendships are formed randomly. See Currarini, Jackson and Pin (2008) for formal de¯nitions.
2individual in the group has many more job contacts if she "sticks" to her specialization. Hence,
sticking to one specialization ensures good job opportunities to the group members, and these
incentives stabilize segregation.
We next extend the basic model allowing for \good" and \bad" jobs, in order to analyze
equilibrium wage and unemployment inequality between the two social groups. We show that
with large di®erences in job attraction (=wages), the main outcome of the model is that one
social group "fully specializes" in the good job, while the other group "mixes" over the two jobs.
In this partial segregation equilibrium, the group that specializes in the good job always has a
higher payo® and a lower unemployment rate. Furthermore, with a su±ciently large intra-group
homophily, the fully-specializing group also has a higher equilibrium employment rate and a
higher wage rate than the "mixing" group, thus being twice advantaged. Hence, our model is
able to explain typical empirical patterns of gender, race or ethnic labor market inequality. The
driving force behind our result is the fact that the group that fully specializes, being homogenous
occupationally, is able to create a denser job contact network than the mixing group.
We ¯nally consider whether society bene¯ts from an integration policy, in that labor inequal-
ity between the social groups is attenuated. To this aim, we analyze a social planner's ¯rst and
second-best policy choices. Surprisingly, segregation is the preferred outcome in the ¯rst-best
analysis, while a laissez-faire policy leading to segregation shaped by individual incentives is
maximizing social welfare in the second-best case. Hence, overall employment is higher under
segregation, while laissez-faire inequality remains su±ciently constrained so that segregation is
an overall socially optimal policy. Our social welfare analysis points out therefore some relevant
policy issues typically ignored in debates concerning anti-segregation legislature.
This paper is mostly related to the segregation framework of Roland Benabou (1993).3 Ben-
abou introduces a model in which individuals choose between high and low education. The
bene¯ts of education, wages, are determined in the global labor market, but the costs are deter-
mined by local education externalities. In particular, the costs of high education are considerably
more reduced than the costs of low education if many neighbors are highly educated as well,
leading to underinvestment in education in the low-education neighborhoods. Benabou shows
that these local education externalities lead to segregation and also to inequality at the macro
level.4 Our model is a version of that of Benabou: the link between local externalities and
3The precursor of many studies on segregation is the seminal work by Schelling (1971), on the emergence of
neighborhood racial segregation from tiny di®erences in the tolerance threshold levels of members of each of two
races, regarding the presence of members of the other race.
4Furthermore, by introducing the option to drop out of the labor market, Benabou shows that some neighbor-
hoods may turn into ghettos of drop-outs, and this has a dramatic impact on total welfare.
3global outcomes is modeled similarly. However, there are a few essential modeling di®erences
leading to markedly di®erent implications. In Benabou (1993) agents choose di®erent education
levels, either high or low, and thus the marginal productivity and the wage are naturally higher
for high-educated workers. Hence, in a segregation equilibrium the highly educated group (or
neighborhood, in Benabou's model) has a natural wage advantage. This implies that, under the
education externality mechanism, di®erences in education levels should fully explain the wage
gap. As we discuss in more detail in Section 2.1, though there is evidence that ability and ed-
ucation di®erences may explain to a considerable extent the racial wage gap, these di®erentials
cannot fully account for the gender wage gap. Moreover, in Benabou there is no involuntary
unemployment and therefore unemployment di®erences (between races/genders/ethnicities) re-
main unexplained.
The main di®erence between this model and Benabou's concerns the results on social welfare.
Whereas Benabou suggests that under education externalities integration may be the socially
optimal policy, we argue here, in contrast, that a social planner would like to segregate society.
The reason for this di®erent outcome is that the education externalities °ow only from high
to low education in Benabou's framework|low educated agents \learn" from high educated
agents|whereas externalities are symmetric in our model and thus equally bene¯cial to both
groups. Intuitively, in Benabou (1993) segregation harms the group that has no high-educated
agents and this group is better o® by enforcing integration. On the other hand, in this paper
contact networks are always more e®ective for both groups when there is segregation. Our paper
thus shows that a subtle di®erence in the mechanism of the local externalities can have major
implications on optimal social policy.
Signi¯cant progress has been lately achieved in modeling labor market phenomena by means
of social networks. Recent articles have for instance investigated the e®ect of social networks
on employment, wage inequality, and labor market transitions.5 This work points out that
individual performance on the labor market crucially depends on the position individuals take
in the social network structure. However, these studies typically do not focus on the role that
networks play in accounting for persistent patterns of occupational segregation and inequality
5The seminal paper on the role of networks in the labor markets is Montgomery (1991). Recent papers include
Arrow and Borzekowski (2004), Calv¶ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007), Fontaine (2008), Lavezzi and Meccheri
(2005), Bramoull¶ e and Saint-Paul (2006), Ioannides and Soutevent (2006).
4between races, genders or ethnicities.6 Here, instead of focusing on the network structure, we
take a simple reduced form approach, and we emphasize the mechanism relating the role of
the job networks in the labor market to occupational segregation and inequality between social
groups.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section shortly overviews empirical ¯ndings on
occupational segregation. We review empirical evidence on the relevance of job contact networks
and the extent of social group homophily in Section 2; we set up our model of occupational segre-
gation in Section 3; and we discuss key results on the segregation equilibria in Section 4. Section
5 analyses the social welfare outcome. We summarize and conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Empirical background
In this section we present the empirical background that motivates the building blocks of our
model. We ¯rst discuss evidence on occupational segregation, and the relation to gender and
race wage gaps. Next we overview some empirical literature on the role of job contact networks
and on homophily.
2.1 The extent of occupational segregation
Although labor markets have become more open to traditionally disadvantaged groups, wage
di®erentials by race and gender remain stubbornly persistent. Altonji and Blank (1999) give
an overview of the literature on this topic. They note for instance that in 1995 a full-time
employed white male earned on average $ 42,742, whereas a full-time employed black male
earned on average $ 29,651, thus 30% less, and an employed white female $ 27,583, that is,
35% less. Standard wage regressions are typically able to explain only half of this gap, but
more detailed analysis reveals more insights. In particular, several authors have found that the
inclusion of individual scores at the Armed Forces Qualifying Test is able to ¯ll the wage gap
on race, see the discussion in Altonji and Blank (1999) and the references therein. On the one
hand, this suggests that the gap between whites and blacks is created before individuals enter
the labor market. On the other hand, the gender wage gap cannot be fully accounted for by
pre-market factors, as men and women usually have similar levels of education nowadays.
6Calv¶ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004) ¯nd that two groups with two di®erent networks may have di®erent
employment rates due to the endogenous decision to drop out of the labor market. However, their ¯nding draws
heavily on an example that already assumes a large amount of inequality; in particular, the groups are initially
unconnected and the initial employment state of the two groups is unequal.
5Much research within social sciences suggests that segregation into separate type of jobs, i.e.
occupational segregation, explains a large part of the gender wage gap, as well as part of the
race wage gap. A few examples of studies that review and/or present detailed statistics on the
occupational segregation7 and wage inequality patterns by gender, race or ethnicity are Beller
(1982), Albelda (1986), King (1992), Padavic and Reskin (2002), Charles and Grusky (2004).
All these studies agree that, despite substantial expansion in the labor market participation of
women and a±rmative action programs aimed at labor integration of racial and ethnic minorities,
women typically remain clustered in female-dominated occupations, while blacks and several
other races and ethnic groups are over-represented in some occupations and under-represented
in others; these occupations are usually of lower 'quality', meaning they are paying less on
average, which explains partly the male-female and white-black wage di®erentials8.
King (1992) o®ers for instance detailed evidence that throughout 1940-1988 there was a
persistent and remarkable level of occupational segregation by race and sex, such that \approx-
imately two-thirds of men or women would have to change jobs to achieve complete gender
integration", with some changes in time for some subgroups. Whereas occupational segregation
between white and black women appears to have diminished during the 60's and the 70's, oc-
cupational segregation between white and black males or between males and females remained
remarkable stable. Several studies by Barbara Reskin and her co-authors, c.f. the discussion and
references in Padavic and Reskin (2002), document the extent of occupational segregation by
narrow race-sex-ethnic cells and ¯nd that segregation by gender remained extremely prevalent
and that within occupations segregated by gender, racial and ethnic groups are also aligned
along stable segregation paths. Though most of these studies are for the USA, there is also
international evidence (particularly from Europe) con¯rming that, with some variations, similar
patterns of segregation hold, e.g. Pettit and Hook (2005).
7Some of these papers, e.g. S¿rensen (2004), discuss in detail the extent of labor market segregation between
social groups, at the workplace, industry and occupation levels. Here we shall be concerned with modeling
segregation by occupation alone (known also as "horizontal segregation"), which appears to be dominant at least
relative to segregation by industry. Weeden and S¿rensen (2004) convincingly show that occupational segregation
in the USA is much stronger than segregation by industries and that if one wishes to focus on one single dimension,
\occupation is a good choice, at least relative to industry".
8The other prominent side of the 'labor market segregation explaining the wage penalty' story is that women
relative to men and, respectively, blacks vis--vis whites might experience wage di®erentials within the same
occupation, when located in di®erent workplaces; then we deal with the so-called vertical segregation dimension.
As stated above, we shall be concerned in this paper only with the occupational dimension, i.e. horizontal
segregation.
62.2 Job contact networks
There is by now an established set of facts showing the importance of the informal job networks
in matching job seekers to vacancies. For instance, on average about 50 percent of the workers
obtain jobs through their personal contacts, e.g. Rees (1966), Granovetter (1995), Holzer (1987),
Montgomery (1991), Topa (2001); Bewley (1999) enumerates several studies published before
the 90's, where the fraction of jobs obtained via friends or relatives ranges between 30 and 60
percent9. It is also established that on average 40-50 percent of the employers actively use social
networks of their current employees to ¯ll their job openings, e.g. Holzer (1987). Furthermore,
employer-employee matches obtained via contacts appear to have some common characteristics.
Those who found jobs through personal contacts were on average more satis¯ed with their job,
e.g. Granovetter (1995), and were less likely to quit, e.g. Datcher (1983), Devine and Kiefer
(1991), Simon and Warner (1992), Datcher Loury (2006). For a more detailed overview of studies
on job information networks, Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) is a recent reference.
2.3 Intra-group homophily
There is considerable evidence on the existence of the so-called social \homophily"10, also labeled
\assortative matching" or \inbreeding social bias", that is, there is a higher probability of
establishing links among people with similar characteristics. Extensive research shows that
people tend to be friends with similar others, see for instance McPherson, et al. (2001) for
a review, with characteristics such as race, ethnicity or gender being essential dimensions of
homophily. It has also been documented that friendship patterns are more homophilous than
would be expected by chance or availability constraints, even after controlling for the unequal
distribution of races or sexes through social structure, e.g. Shrum, Cheek and Hunter (1988).
There are also studies pointing towards "pure" same race preferences in marrying or dating (e.g.
the \mating taboo" in Wong 2003 or the speed dating preferences in Fishman, et al. 2006),
among very young kids (e.g. Hraba and Grant 1970) or among audiences of television shows
(Dates 1980, Lee 2006).
9The di®erence in the use of informal job networks among professions is also documented. Granovetter (1995)
pointed out that although personal ties seem to be relevant in job search-match for all professions, their incidence
is higher for blue-collar workers (50 to 65 percent) than for white-collar categories such as accountants or typists
(20 to 40 percent). However, for certain other white-collar categories, the use of social connection in job ¯nding
is even higher than for blue-collars, e.g. as high as 77 percent for academics.
10The "homophily theory" of friendship was ¯rst introduced and popularized by the sociologists Paul F. Lazars-
feld and Robert K. Merton (1954).
7In our "job information network" context, early studies by Rees (1966) and Doeringer and
Piore (1971) showed that workers who had been asked for references concerning new hires were
in general very likely to refer people "similar" to themselves. While these similar features could
be anything, such as ability, education, age, race and so on, the focus here is on groups strati¯ed
along exogenous characteristics (i.e. one is born in such a group and cannot alter her group
membership) such as those divided along gender, race or ethnicity lines. Indeed, most subsequent
evidence on homophily was in the context of such 'exogenously given' social groups. For instance,
Marsden (1987) ¯nds using the U.S. General Social Survey that personal contact networks tend
to be highly segregated by race, while other studies such as Brass (1985) or Ibarra (1992), using
cross-sectional single ¯rm data, ¯nd signi¯cant gender segregation in personal networks. Recent
evidence is also given by Mayer and Puller (2008) and Currarini, et al. (2008).
Direct evidence of large gender homophily within job contact networks comes from tabula-
tions in Montgomery (1992). Over all occupations in a US sample from the National Longi-
tudinal Study of Youth, 87 percent of the jobs men obtained through contacts were based on
information received from other men and 70 percent of the jobs obtained informally by women
were as result of information from other women. Montgomery shows that these outcomes hold
even when looking at each narrowly de¯ned occupation categories or one-digit industries11, in-
cluding traditionally male or female dominated occupations, where job referrals for the minority
group members were obtained still with a very strong assortative matching via their own gender
group. For example, in male-dominated occupations such as machine operators, 81 percent of
the women who found their job through a referral, had a female reference. Such ¯gures are
surprisingly large and are likely to be only lower bounds for magnitudes of inbreeding biases
within other social groups12.
Another relevant piece of evidence is the empirical study by Fernandez and Sosa (2005) who
use a dataset documenting both the recruitment and the hiring stages for an entry-level job at
a call center of a large US bank. This study also ¯nds that contact networks contribute to the
gender skewing of jobs, in addition documenting directly that there is strong evidence of gender
11Weeden and S¿rensen (2004) estimate a two-dimensional model of gender segregation, by industry and occu-
pation: they ¯nd much stronger segregation across occupations than across industries. 86% of the total association
in the data is explained by the segregation along the occupational dimension; this increases to about 93% once
industry segregation is also accounted for. See also footnote 8.
12The gender homophily is likely to be smaller than race or ethnic homophily, given frequent close-knit rela-
tionships between men and women. This is con¯rmed for instance by Marsden (1988), who ¯nds strong inbreeding
biases in contacts between individuals of the same race or ethnicity, but less pronounced homophily within gender
categories.
8homophily in the refereeing process: referees of both genders tend to strongly produce same sex
referrals.
Finally, we brie°y address the relative importance of homophily within "exogenously given"
versus "endogenously created" social groups. As mentioned above, assortative matching takes
place along a great variety of dimensions. However, there is empirical literature suggesting that
homophily within exogenous groups such as those divided by race, ethnicity, gender, and- to a
certain extent- religion, typically outweighs assortative matching within endogenously formed
groups such as those strati¯ed by educational, political or economic lines. E.g., Marsden (1988)
¯nds for US strong inbreeding bias in contacts between individuals of the same race or ethnicity
and less pronounced homophily by education level. Another study by Tampubolon (2005),
using UK data, documents the dynamics of friendship as strongly a®ected by gender, marital
status and age, but not by education, and only marginally by social class. These facts motivate
why we focus here on "naturally" arising social groups, such as gender, racial or ethnic ones;
nevertheless, as will become clear in the modeling, assuming assortative matching by education,
in addition to gender, racial or ethnic homophily, does not matter for our conclusions.
3 A model of occupational segregation
Based on the stylized facts mentioned in Section 2.2, we build a parsimonious theoretical model
of social network interaction able to explain stable occupational segregation, and employment
and wage gaps, without a need for alternative theories.
Let us consider the following setup. A continuum of individuals with measure 1 is equally
divided into two social groups, Reds (R) and Greens (G). The individuals are ex ante homoge-
neous apart from their social color. They can work in two occupations, A or B. Each occupation
requires a corresponding thorough specialized education (career track), such that a worker can-
not work in it unless she followed that education track. We assume that it is too costly for
individuals to follow both educational tracks. Hence, individuals have to choose their education
track before they enter the labor market.13
Consider now the following order of events:
1. Individuals choose one education in order to specialize either in occupation A or in occu-
pation B;
13For example, graduating high school students may face the choice of pursuing a medical career or a career in
technology. Both choices require several years of expensive specialized training, and this makes it unfeasible to
follow both career tracks.
92. Individuals randomly establish \friendship" relationships, thus forming a network of con-
tacts;
3. Individuals participate in the labor market. Individual i obtains a job with probability si.
4. Individuals produce a single good for their ¯rms and earn a wage wi. They obtain utility
from consuming goods that they buy with their wage.
We proceed with an elaboration of these steps.
3.1 Education strategy and equilibrium concept
The choice of education in the ¯rst stage involves strategic behavior. Workers choose the educa-
tion that maximizes their expected payo® given the choices of other workers, and we therefore
look for a Nash equilibrium in this stage. This can be formalized as follows.
Denote by ¹R and ¹G the fractions of Reds and respectively Greens that choose education
A. It follows that fraction 1 ¡ ¹X of group X 2 fR;Gg chooses education B. The payo®s will
depend on these strategies: the payo® of a worker of group X that chooses education A is given
by ¦X
A(¹R;¹G), and mutatis mutandis, ¦X
B(¹R;¹G). De¯ne ¢¦X ´ ¦X
A ¡ ¦X
B. The functional
form of the payo®s is made more speci¯c later, in subsection 3.4.
In a Nash equilibrium each worker chooses the education that gives her the highest payo®,
given the education choices of all other workers. Since workers of the same social group are
homogenous, a Nash equilibrium implies that if some worker in a group chooses education A
(B), then no other worker in the same group should prefer education B (A). This implies that
a pair (¹R;¹G) is an equilibrium if and only if, for X 2 fR;Gg, the following hold:14
¢¦X(¹R;¹G) · 0 if ¹X = 0 (1)
¢¦X(¹R;¹G) = 0 if 0 < ¹X < 1 (2)
¢¦X(¹R;¹G) ¸ 0 if ¹X = 1: (3)
To strengthen the equilibrium concept, we restrict ourselves to stable equilibria. We use a
simple stability concept based on a standard myopic adjustment process of strategies, which
14The question whether the equilibrium is in pure or mixed strategies is not relevant, because the player set is a
measure of identical in¯nitesimal individuals (except for group membership). Our equilibrium could be interpreted
as a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies; then ¹X is the measure of players in group X choosing pure strategy
A. The equilibrium could also be interpreted as a symmetric Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies; in that case
the common strategy of all players in group X is to play A with probability ¹X. A hybrid interpretation is also
possible.
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group
di®erent p + · p
takes place before the education decision is made. That is, we think of the equilibrium as
the outcome of an adjustment process. In this process, individuals repeatedly announce their
preferred education choice, and more and more workers revise their education choice if it is
pro¯table to do so, given the choice of the other workers.15 Concretely, we consider stationary
points of a dynamic system guided by the di®erential equation _ ¹X = k¢¦X(¹R;¹G). This
implies that ¹ ´ (¹R;¹G) is a stable equilibrium if it is an equilibrium and (i) for X 2 fR;Gg:
@¢¦X=@¹X < 0 if ¢¦X = 0; (ii) det(D¢¦(¹)) > 0 if ¢¦R = 0 and ¢¦G = 0, where D¢¦(¹)
is the Jacobian of (¢¦R;¢¦G) with respect to ¹.
3.2 Network formation
In the second stage the workers form a network of contacts. We assume this network to be
random, but with social color homophily. That is, we assume that the probability for two
workers to create a tie is p ¸ 0 when the two workers are from di®erent social groups and follow
di®erent education tracks; however, when the two workers are from the same social group, the
probability of creating a tie increases with ¸ > 0. Similarly, if two workers choose the same
education, then the probability of creating a tie increases with · ¸ 0. Hence, we allow for
assortative matching by education, in addition to the one by social color. We do not impose
any further restrictions on these parameters, other than securing p + ¸ + · · 1: This leads to
the tie formation probabilities from Table 1. We shall refer to two workers that create a tie as
\friends"
We assume the probability that an individual i forms a tie with individual j to be exogenously
given and constant. In practice, establishing a friendship between two individuals typically in-
volves rational decision making. It is therefore plausible that individuals try to optimize their
15One could think of such a process as the discussions students have before the end of the high school about
their preferred career. An alternative with a longer horizon is an overlapping generations model, in which the
education choice of each new generation partly depends on the choice of the previous generation.
11job contact network in order to maximize their chances on the labor market.16 In particular,
individuals from the disadvantaged social groups should have an incentive to form ties with
individuals from the advantaged group. While this argument is probably true, we do not incor-
porate this aspect of network formation in our model. The harsh reality is that strategic network
formation does not appear to dampen the inbreeding bias in social networks signi¯cantly; in Sec-
tion 2.2 we provided an abundance of evidence that strong homophily exists even within groups
that have strong labor market incentives not to preserve such homophily in forming their ties.
The reason could be that the payo® of forming a tie is mainly determined by various social
and cultural factors, and only for a smaller part by bene¯ts from the potential transmission of
valuable job information.17 On top of that, studies such as, for instance, Granovetter (2002),
also note that many people would feel exploited if they ¯nd out that someone befriends them for
the sel¯sh reason of obtaining job information. These elements might hinder the role of labor
market incentives when forming ties. Hence, while we do not doubt that incentives do play a
role when forming ties, we believe these incentives are not su±cient to undo the e®ects of the
social color homophily. We therefore assume network formation exogenous in this paper.
3.3 Job matching and social networks
The third stage we envision for this model is that of a dynamic labor process, in which infor-
mation on vacancies is propagated through the social network, as in, e.g., Calv¶ o-Armengol and
Jackson (2004), Calv¶ o-Armengol and Zenou (2005), Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) or Bramoull¶ e
and Saint-Paul (2006). Workers who randomly lose their job are initially unemployed because it
takes time to ¯nd information on new jobs. The unemployed worker receives such information
either directly, through formal search, or indirectly, through employed friends who receive the
information and pass it on to her (in the particular case where all her friends are unemployed,
only the formal search method works). As the speci¯c details of such a process are not important
for our purposes, we do not consider these dynamic models explicitly, but take a "reduced form"
approach.
In particular, we assume that unemployed workers have a higher propensity to receive job
information when they have more friends with the same job background, that is, with the same
choice of education. On the one hand, this assumption is based on the result of Ioannides and
Soetevent (2006) that in a random network setting the individuals with more friends have a
16See Calv¶ o-Armengol (2004) for a model of strategic network formation in the labor market.
17Currarini, et al.(2008) discuss a model of network formation in which individuals form preferences on the
number and mix of same-group and other-group friends. In this model inbreeding homophily arises endogenously.
12lower unemployment rate.18 On the other hand, this assumption is based on the conjecture
that workers are more likely to receive information about jobs in their own occupation. For
example, when a vacancy is opened in a team, the other team members are the ¯rst to know
this information, and are also the ones that have the highest incentives to spread this information
around.
Formally, denote the probability that individual i becomes employed by si = s(xi), where
xi is the measure of friends of i with the same education as i has. We thus assume that s(x)
is di®erentiable, 0 < s(0) < 1 (there is non-zero amount of direct job search) and s0(x) > 0 for
all x > 0 (the probability of being employed increases in the number of friends with the same
education).
It is instructive to show how si depends on the education choices of i and the choices of all
other workers. Remember that ¹R and ¹G are the fractions of Reds and respectively Greens
that choose education A. Given the tie formation probabilities from Table 1 and some algebra,
the employment rate sX
A of A-workers in group X 2 fR;Gg will be given by:
sX
A(¹R;¹G) = s((p + ·)¹ ¹ + ¸¹X=2) (4)
and likewise, the employment rate sX
B of B-workers in group X will be
sX
B(¹R;¹G) = s((p + ·)(1 ¡ ¹ ¹) + ¸(1 ¡ ¹X)=2) (5)





B for X;Y 2 fR;Gg, X 6= Y , if and only if ¹X > ¹Y
and ¸ > 0. We will see in Section 4.1 that the ranking of the employment rates is crucial, as
it creates a group-speci¯c network e®ect. That is, keeping this ordering, if only employment
matters (jobs are equally attractive), then individuals have an incentive to choose the same
education as other individuals in their social group. Importantly, it is straightforward to see
that this ordering of the employment rates depends on ¸, but it does not depend on ·. Therefore,
only the homophily among members of the same social group- and not the eventual assortative
matching by education- is relevant to our results.
18This result is nontrivial, as the unemployed friends of employed individuals tend to compete with each other
for job information. Thus, if a friend of a jobseeker has more friends, the probability that this friend passes
information to the jobseeker decreases. In fact, in a setting in which everyone has the same number of friends,
Calv¶ o-Armengol and Zenou (2005) show that the unemployment rate is non-monotonic in the (common) number
of friends.
133.4 Wages, consumption and payo®s
The eventual payo® of the workers depends on the wage they receive, the goods they buy with
that wage, and the utility they derive from consumption. Without loss of generality we assume
that an unemployed worker receives zero wage. However, the wages of employed workers are not
exogenously given, but they are determined by supply and demand.
When ¯rms o®er wages, they take into account that there are labor market frictions and that
it is impossible to employ all workers simultaneously. Thus what matters is the e®ective supply
of labor as determined by the labor market process in stage 3. Let LA be the total measure of





LB(¹R;¹G) = (1 ¡ ¹R)sR
B(¹R;¹G)=2 + (1 ¡ ¹G)sG
B(¹R;¹G)=2: (7)
Given (4) and (5) from above, it is easy to check that LA is increasing with ¹R and ¹G, whereas
LB is decreasing with ¹R, ¹G.
As in Benabou (1993), consumption, prices, utility, the demand for labor and the implied
wages are determined in a 1-good, 2-factor general equilibrium model. All individuals have
the same utility function U : R+ ! R, which is strictly increasing and strictly concave with
U(0) = 0. The single consumer good sells at unit price, such that consumption of this good
equals wage and indirect utility is given by Ui = U(wi).
Firms put A-workers and B-workers together to produce the single good at constant returns
to scale. Wages are then determined by the production function F(LA;LB). As usually, we
assume that F is strictly increasing and strictly concave in LA and LB and @2F=@LA@LB > 0.
Writing the wage as function of education choices and using (6) and (7), the wages of A-workers










It is easy to check that wA is strictly decreasing with ¹R and ¹G, and mutatis mutandis, wB.
We can now de¯ne the payo® of a worker as her expected utility at the time of decision-








If we do not impose further restrictions, then there could be multiple equilibria, most of
them uninteresting. To ensure a unique equilibrium in our model (actually: two symmetric
equilibria), we make the following two assumptions.





U(wB(1 ¡ x;1 ¡ x)) = 1:









































Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee the uniqueness of our results. Assumption 1 implies that
the wage for scarce labor is so high that at least some workers always ¯nd it attractive to
choose education A or respectively B; everyone going for one of the two educations cannot be
an equilibrium. In Assumption 2 we assume that the education choice of an individual has a
smaller marginal e®ect on the employment probability within a group than on the wages and









and it is this feature that guarantees the uniqueness of our results. The assumption is not
restrictive as long as there is su±cient direct job search, because the employment probability
of each individual in our model is bounded between s(0) > 0 and 1, with s(0) capturing the
employment probability in the absence of any ties and thus induced only by the exogenously
given direct job ¯nding rate. Hence, a higher s(0) implies less of an impact of the network e®ect
on the employment rate.
It should be noted that we make these assumptions above only in order to focus our analysis
on segregation outcomes, for the sake of clarity and brevity. These assumptions are not necessary.
For instance, in the calibration exercise of Section 5.2.1, Assumption 2 is violated, but there are
still (two) unique equilibria.
154 Equilibrium results
We now present the equilibrium analysis of our model. The formal proofs of all subsequent
propositions are relegated to the Appendix. Without loss of generality we assume throughout
the section that wA(1;0) ¸ wB(1;0), thus that the A-occupation is weakly more attractive than
the B-occupation when e®ective labor supply is equal. We call A the \good" job, and B the
\bad" job.
4.1 Occupational segregation
We are in particular interested in those equilibria in which there is segregation. We de¯ne
complete segregation if ¹R = 0 and ¹G = 1, or, vice versa, ¹R = 1 and ¹G = 0. On the other
hand, we say that there is partial segregation if for X 2 fR;Gg and Y 2 fR;Gg, Y 6= X: ¹X = 0
but ¹Y < 1, or, vice versa, ¹X = 1 but ¹Y > 0.
Our ¯rst result is that segregation, either complete or partial, is the only stable outcome:


















then there are exactly two stable equilibria, both with partial segregation, in which either
¹R = 1 or ¹G = 1.
We ¯rst note that a non-segregation equilibrium cannot exist, even in the case of a tiny
amount of homophily (¸ very small). The intuition is that homophily in the social network
among members of the same social group creates a group-dependent network e®ect. Thus, if
slightly more Red workers choose A than Greens do, then the value of an A-education is higher
for the Reds than for the Greens, while the value of a B-education is lower in the Reds' group.
Positive feedback then ensures that the initially small di®erences in education choices between
the two groups widen and widen, until at least one group segregates completely into one type
of education.
16Second, if the wage di®erential between the two jobs (for equal numbers of A-educated and
B-educated workers) is not "too large" vis--vis the social network e®ect (condition 10), complete
segregation is the only stable equilibrium outcome, given a positive inbreeding bias in the social
group. Thus one social group specializes in one occupation, and the other group in the other
occupation. On the other hand, the proposition makes clear that complete segregation cannot
be sustained if the wage di®erential is "too large" vis--vis the social network e®ect (condition
11). Starting from complete segregation, a large wage di®erential gives incentives to the group
specialized in B-jobs to switch to A-jobs.
Interestingly, the "unsustainable" complete segregation equilibrium is then replaced by a
partial equilibrium in which one group specializes in the \good" job A, while the other group has
both A and B-workers. Partial segregation in which one group, say the Greens, fully specializes
in the \bad" job B is unsustainable, as that would lead to an oversupply of B-workers and an
even larger wage di®erential. This would provide the Red B-workers with strong incentives to
switch en masse to the A-occupation.
4.2 Inequality
The discussion so far ignored eventual equilibrium di®erentials in wages and unemployment
between the two types of jobs. We now tackle that case. We continue to assume that wA(1;0) ¸
wB(1;0) and, in light of the results of Proposition 1, we focus without loss of generality on the
equilibrium in which ¹R = 1. Thus, the Reds specialize in the \good" job A, while the \bad"
job B is only performed by Green workers.
We ¯rst consider the case in which wage di®erentials are small enough so that complete
segregation is an equilibrium (¹R = 1 and ¹G = 0). In this case the implications are straight-
forward. Since both groups specialize in equal amounts, the network e®ects are equally strong,
and the employment rates are equal. Given that employment rates are equal, the e®ective labor
supply is also equal, and therefore the wage of the \good" job is weakly higher. We thus have
the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. De¯ne sH ´ s((p + · + ¸)=2) and sL ´
s((p+·)=2) and suppose that 1 ·
wA(1;0)
wB(1;0) · sH














This result is not very surprising, hence we turn next to the analysis of the more interesting
case in which wage di®erentials are large. In that case there is a partial equilibrium in which









Thus, whereas workers in group R prefer the A-job, the workers in group G make an individual
trade-o®: lower wages should be exactly compensated by higher employment probabilities and
vice versa.
We are particularly interested in whether this individual trade-o® between unemployment
and wages translates into a similar trade-o® at the 'macro-level', in which an inter-group wage
gap is compensated by a reversed employment gap. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. De¯ne sH ´ s((p + · + ¸)=2) and sL ´
s((p + ·)=2) and suppose that
wA(1;0)
wB(1;0) > sH
sL . De¯ne ^ ¹ 2 (0;1), such that
wA(1; ^ ¹) = wB(1; ^ ¹); (13)

























The main implication of this proposition is that an inter-group wage gap is not compensated
by a reversed employment gap. On the contrary, it is possible that the group specializing in
the good job, here the Reds, both earns a higher wage and has higher employment probabilities
than the Greens group. This is especially clear when the group homophily bias ¸ is large relative
to p and · (in fact p + ·) and there is a big di®erence in attractiveness between the good and
the bad jobs (case (i) above).
This result can be understood by the following observation: the workers in the 'specializing'
group R have a higher employment probability than all workers in group G. This is always the
case, regardless of whether the individual in G is an A or a B worker, and whether sG
B > sG
A
or not. As all members of group R choose the same occupation, the Reds remain a strong
homogenous social group. Network formation with homophily then implies that they are able
to create a lot of ties, and hence, that they bene¯t most from their social network. On the other
hand, the Greens are dispersed between two occupations. This weakens their social network and
this decreases their chances on the labor market, both for A and B-workers in group G.
Whether the wage di®erential between the workers in the two groups is positive or negative
depends on the relative size of ¸ relative to p + ·, in the term ¸
2(p+·+¸) from the inequality
conditions in Proposition 3. This can be roughly assessed in light of the empirical evidence on
homophily discussed earlier in this paper. First, as seen from the stylized facts from Section 2.2,
the assortative matching by education, ·, is typically found to be lower relative to racial, ethnical
or gender homophily. The second interesting situation is a scenario where the probability of
making contacts in general, p, were already extremely high relative to the intra-group homophily
bias. However, given the surprisingly large size of intra-group inbreeding biases in personal
networks of contacts found empirically, this is also unlikely. Hence, the likelihood is very high
that in practice ¸ would dominate the other parameters in the cuto® term ¸
2(p+·+¸).
Let us sum up the implications of this last proposition. The fully specializing group is always
better o® in terms of unemployment rate and payo®, independent of either relative or absolute
sizes of ¸, p and · (as long as ¸ > 0), as shown in Proposition 3. Furthermore, given the observed
patterns of social networks discussed in Section 2.2, the condition of ¸ dominant relative to p
and · is likely to be met. This ensures that the group fully specializing in the good job always
19has a higher wage in the equilibrium than the group mixing over the two jobs, as proved in
Proposition 3. Note that this partial segregation equilibrium is in remarkable agreement with
observed occupational, wage and unemployment disparities in the labor market between, for
instance, males-females or blacks-whites. This suggests that our simple model o®ers a plausible
explanation for major empirical patterns of labor market inequality.
5 Social welfare
5.1 First best social optimum
In the previous section we observed that individual incentives lead to occupational segregation
and wage and unemployment inequality. This suggests that a policy targeting integration may
reduce inequality as well, and in fact may just be socially bene¯cial. This is an argument often
used for instance by proponents of positive discrimination. We set out here to analyze the
implications of our model from a social planner's point of view.
Consider a utilitarian social welfare function:
W(¹R;¹G) = ¹R¦R
A=2 + (1 ¡ ¹R)¦R
B=2 + ¹G¦G






B(¹R;¹G) are given by equations (8) and (9). Since














where LA ´ LA(¹R;¹G) and LB ´ LB(¹R;¹G) were introduced by (6) and (7). The formulation
in (16) is useful, because it shows that what matters for social welfare is the e®ect of a policy
on the society's e®ective labor supply.
We consider a ¯rst-best social optimum, that is, the social planner is able to fully manage
¹R 2 [0;1] and ¹G 2 [0;1] and therefore the social optimum ¹S = (¹S
R;¹S
G) is de¯ned as
¹S = argmax¹R2[0;1];¹G2[0;1]W(¹R;¹G):
We obtain the following result:





then any social optima involves complete or partial segregation.
20Thus a segregation policy is socially preferred, as long as s(x), the employment probability
of having x friends with the same education, is "not too concave". This proposition can be
intuitively understood as follows. Suppose that there is no segregation, and 0 < ¹G < ¹R < 1.
In that case the Reds obtain a higher employment probability in an A-occupation, sR
A > sR
B,
whereas the Greens have a higher employment rate as B-workers, sG
B > sG
A. Now consider the
e®ect on segregation, wages and employment when a social planner forces a Red individual
initially choosing a B-occupation and respectively, a Green individual initially choosing an A-
occupation, into switching their occupation choice. In that case ¹R slightly increases, whereas ¹G
slightly decreases. The result of this event is, ¯rst, that segregation increases; the gap between
¹R and ¹G becomes larger. Second, the total fraction of individuals that choose occupation A,
¹R+¹G, does not change. So the ratio of A-workers versus B-workers does not change much, and
therefore the ratio of wages does not change much either. Thus the e®ect on wage inequality
is only marginal. Third, by switching occupations, the Red worker can now bene¯t from a
denser network, and have an employment probability sR
A instead of sR
B. The same is true for the
Green worker switching from B to A. Thus, the combined payo® of the two workers increases,
as they are both more likely to become employed. We also need to consider the externality
on the employment rates of the workers not involved in the occupation switch. In particular,
the switch of occupations increases the network e®ects of the other Red A-workers and Green
B-workers, whereas it decreases the network e®ects of Red B-workers and Green A-workers.
The restriction on the concavity of s(x) ensures that the switch of occupations puts on average
a positive externality on the employment probabilities of other workers. We conclude that the
switch of occupations of the two workers hardly a®ects wage inequality, while it increases the
labor supply of both A and B. Therefore, social welfare increases.
The general message of this result is that an integration policy might have detrimental e®ects
on employment, e®ects that are usually overlooked by strong advocates of positive discrimina-
tion. Under our model's assumptions, integration might weaken the employment chances of
individuals, because the network e®ects are weaker in mixed networks. In the case of complete
segregation, individuals are surrounded by similar individuals during their education. There-
fore, it is easier for them to make many friends they can rely on when searching on the job
market. Consequently, employment probabilities are high. On the other hand, if educations are
mixed, then individuals have more di±culties in creating useful job contacts, and therefore their
employment probabilities are lower.
21It is worth to point out that the result that integration weakens network e®ects and decreases
labor market opportunities has empirical support in related literature on segregation. For ex-
ample, Currarini, et al. (2008) ¯nd clear evidence that larger (racial) minorities create more
friendships, and Marsden (1987) ¯nds a similar pattern in his network of advice. Therefore, it is
more bene¯cial for a worker to choose an education in which she is only surrounded by similar
others, instead of an education in which racial groups are mixed, let alone one in which she is
a small minority. In a di®erent but related context, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000, 2002) ¯nd
that participation in social activities is lower in racially mixed communities and so is the level
of trust. These and our results suggest that possible negative impacts of integration on social
network e®ects should also be taken into account.
Our outcome on the ¯rst-best social optimum hinges for a large part on the fact that the social
planner is able to increase employment by increasing segregation, while still controlling wage
inequality. In reality however, a social planner may not have this amount of control. Perhaps
a more feasible policy is a policy in which the social planner enforces and stabilizes integration,
but where the exact allocation of workers to occupations is determined by individual incentives.
In the case of segregation there would be a potentially large inequality in payo®s between the
social groups, whereas in the case of integration there may be complete payo® equality, but
employment may be lower. This suggests a second-best analysis of social welfare, in which there
is a potential trade-o® of segregation between network bene¯ts and inequality. Such an analysis
is unfeasible without further speci¯cation of the parameters, hence we will perform that analysis
subsequent to calibrating the model for suitable parameters and functional forms.
5.2 Second best social optimum
5.2.1 Numerical simulation
As often done in such frameworks, e.g. Fontaine (2008), we calibrate the parameters, in order
to perform a small numerical simulation of our model. The purpose of this simulation is to get
a better feeling on the mechanisms of the model, the restrictiveness of our assumptions, and the
magnitude of the wage gap that can be generated. The simulation also allows us to get some
insights about a second-best welfare policy.
We ¯rst specify functional forms for s(x), the employment probability as function of the
number of friends with the same education, F(LA;LB), the production function and thus the
derived wage functions, and U(x), the utility function. Regarding the employment probability,
we consider a function that follows from a dynamic labor process, in which employed individuals
become unemployed at rate 1, and in which unemployed individuals become employed at rate
22c0 + c1x, where c0 is the rate at which unemployed workers directly obtain information on job




1 + c0 + c1x
:
Since we have de¯ned s0 = s(0) as the employment probability when only direct search is used,
it follows that s0 = c0=(1 + c0).
For the production function we assume the commonly used Cobb-Douglas function with




For the utility function we consider a function with constant absolute risk aversion, where ½ is
the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion. That is
U(x) = 1 ¡ e¡½x:
We calibrate the parameters s0;c1(p + ·);c1¸;p and µ, leaving ® as a free parameter. First,
we calibrate s0, c1(p + ·), and c1¸ from three equations that are motivated by the empirical
evidence given in Section 2 and 3. This parameterization is su±cient to perform the simulation,
and it is thus not necessary to separately specify c1, p, · and ¸. The ¯rst equation is obtained
by imposing the restriction that about 50% of the workers ¯nd their job through friends, as
suggested in Section 2. This restriction implies that the direct job arrival rate c0 should equal
the indirect job arrival rate through friends c1x. The indirect job arrival rate di®ers, depending
on the choices of the individuals, but if we focus on the case complete segregation, in which
¹R = 1 and ¹G = 0, then we can impose the following restriction:
c0 = c1(p + · + ¸)=2:
Next, we calibrate the amount of inbreeding homophily in the social group. This amount
typically di®ers depending on the group de¯ning characteristic. For example, analyzing data on
Facebook participants at Texas A&M, Mayer and Puller (2008) ¯nd that two students living in
the same dorm are 13 more likely to be friends than two random students, two black students 17
more likely, but two Asian students 5 times more likely and two Hispanic students twice as likely
to be friends. In light of this evidence, we chose to keep the amount of inbreeding homophily in
the simulation modest, imposing ¸ = 3(p + ·).





23Table 2: Chosen parameter values in the simulation and the sensitivity with respect to ^ ® and
the maximum wage gap.
Parameter Value Elasticity of ^ ® Elasticity of wage gap
^ ® = :5904 G(1;0) = :306
s0 .9048 -1.71 -9.47
c1(p + ·) 4.75 -.04 -.23
c1¸ 14.25 .08 .46
½ 1:0 £ 10¡4 .38 2.09
µ 80,000 .38 2.09








and further that c1(p + ·) = 4:75 and c1¸ = 14:25.
Let us consider now the productivity parameter µ and the coe±cient of absolute risk aversion
½. The coe±cient of absolute risk aversion has been estimated between 6:6£10¡5 and 3:1£10¡4
(Gertner 1993, Metrick 1995, Cohen and Einav 2007 ). We set the risk aversion at 1:0 £ 10¡4,
which means a coe±cient of relative risk aversion of 4 at a wealth level of $ 40,000, or indi®erence
at participating in a lottery of getting $ 100.00 or losing $ 99.01 with equal probability.
The productivity parameter, µ, is chosen such that average income equal $ 40,000 in the
case of complete segregation, (¹R;¹G) = (1;0), and ® = :5.19 Since in that situation wA(1;0) =
wB(1;0) = µ=2, we have µ = 80;000.
We can now look at the dependence of payo®s, wages and employment on ® with s0, c1(p+·),
c1¸, ½ and µ as summarized in Table 2, and in which ¹R and ¹G are determined by equilibrium
conditions (1)-(3). Given the result of Proposition 1 that there is either a complete equilibrium
or a partial equilibrium, in which one group specializes in the good job, we concentrate our
attention to the parameter space in which ® 2 [1=2;1), ¹R = 1 and ¹G 2 [0;1). Thus occupation
A is \good", and group R specializes in A.
We ¯rst show a plot of ¢¦G(1;¹G) as a function of ¹G for di®erent values of ®. This function
illustrates the payo® evaluation that a Green individual makes when deciding on its occupation.
If ¢¦G(1;¹G) > (<)0, then the Green individual prefers A (B) if she beliefs that all Reds
choose A and fraction ¹G of Greens choose A. Clearly, in an equilibrium it should hold that
either ¢¦G(1;0) < 0 or ¢¦G(1;¹G) = 0.
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Figure 1: ¢¦G(1;¹G) as a function of ¹G for di®erent values of ®.
The plot is displayed in Figure 1. This plot nicely illustrates the workings of the model.
First, note that for ® = :5, ¢¦G(1;¹G) is clearly negative, so given that the Reds choose A; the
Greens prefer B and complete segregation is an equilibrium. However, ¢¦G(1;¹G) increases
with ®, such that for ® > :5904 ´ ^ ®, we have that ¢¦G(1;0) > 0 and complete segregation is
not an equilibrium anymore. In that case, there is a unique partial equilibrium.20
If ® < :5904 we have complete segregation as an equilibrium. In that case Proposition 2
gives us the employment rates and wages. Employment rates are given by:
sR
A = sG
B = :95 and sR
B = sG
A = :9223:
Wages have a particular simple form in the case of complete segregation, being wA(1;0) =
µ® and wB(1;0) = µ(1 ¡ ®). Therefore, if we de¯ne the wage gap as G(¹R;¹G) = 1 ¡
wB(¹R;¹G)=wA(¹R;¹G), then the wage gap under complete segregation is G(1;0) = 2 ¡ 1=®.
Note that at ® = ^ ® = :5904, we have
wA(1;0) = 47;233 and wB(1;0) = 32;767
20¢¦
G(1;¹G) is not monotonically decreasing for very large ®, which implies that Assumption 2 is violated.
Nonetheless, there is still a unique equilibrium for all values of ®.
25and the wage gap is thus G(1;0) = :306. Hence, a small employment gap of .9223 versus .95 is
only compensated by a wage gap of 30 %!
It is worth elaborating on this potentially large wage gap. In equilibrium group R is com-
pletely specialized in education A. Therefore the wage and unemployment gap are determined by
the trade o® that workers from group G are making. Choosing education A gives Green workers
a higher wage than education B, but in education B there would be few Green colleagues, and
therefore fewer job contacts. Therefore choosing A would result in a lower employment rate for
Green workers. What is surprising is that this unemployment gap may be quite small compared
to the wage gap that compensates the unemployment gap. In particular, in our simulation, at
® = ^ ®, the wage gap of 30 % is compensated by an employment gap of about 3 %. The reason
for this tenfold magni¯cation is risk aversion of individuals. Individuals try to avoid the (small)
risk of unemployment, in which they have a payo® equal to 0, and they are willing to accept
even major losses in income in order to accomplish that.21
We would like to know whether an even larger wage gap can be sustained in a partial segre-
gation equilibrium when ® > ^ ® = :5904. We therefore plot the equilibrium wages, wA(1;¹¤) and





tion of ®. Remember that the equilibrium ¹¤ equals zero when ® · ^ ®, and solves ¢¦G(1;¹¤) = 0
when ® > ^ ®. These plots are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
The pictures clearly con¯rm Propositions 2 and 3. Moreover, for the chosen parameters we
also observe that the wage gap G(1;¹¤) is maximized at ® = ^ ®. When ® becomes larger than
^ ®, the wage of A declines and the wage of B increases until the wage gap is reversed.
We next look at the sensitivity of ^ ® with respect to the parameter choices, as we saw that
at ® = ^ ® the wage gap is maximized. We do this by computing the elasticities of ^ ® and of the
implied wage gap G(1;0) at the chosen parameters. That is, we look at the percentage increase
of ^ ® and the maximum wage gap change when a parameter increases by 1% . The elasticities
are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2. We note that ^ ® and the implied maximum wage gap
are most sensitive to ½µ, the coe±cient of relative risk aversion. A 1% increase in this coe±cient
leads to a 2% increase in the maximum wage gap. On the other hand, our calibration seems
least sensitive to the network parameters c1(p + ·) and c1¸. The maximum wage gap seems to
be close to linear with respect to 1¡s0, the unemployment rate if a worker only consider direct
21The risk aversion e®ect, and thus the wage gap, may be smaller if unemployment is only temporary, and indi-
viduals only care about permanent income. On the other hand, from prospect theory it is known that individual
agents tend to emphasize small probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), and thus the small probability of
becoming unemployed may get excessive weight in the education decision.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium employment rates as function of®.
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Figure 4: The percentage increase in welfare of a policy that enforces perfect integration.
search techniques. That is, if we chose s0 = :95 instead of s0 = :90, it would roughly halve the
maximum wage gap.
5.2.2 Implications for the second-best welfare outcome
We now consider the analysis of a second-best optimum. Namely, we suppose that the govern-
ment (social planner) does not have the institutions to completely control ¹R and ¹G, but that it
is able to stabilize a symmetric equilibrium, such that ¹R = ¹G = ¹S.22 Should the government
do this? In case the government stabilizes integration, we still impose the equilibrium condition,






Hence, in the symmetric case there is complete equality. On the other hand, in the case of
segregation, we consider the equilibrium allocation (¹R;¹G) = (1;¹¤), such that Reds obtain a
higher payo® than Greens. Therefore, we might face a tradeo® when assessing an integration
policy. It enforces equality, but it might decrease employment.
To this purpose we plot the increase in social welfare from such an integration policy, I =
W(¹S;¹S)=W(1;¹¤) ¡ 1, as function of ®. Figure 4 shows this plot.
22In the proof of Lemma 1 we show that there exists a symmetric equilibrium, but that it is unstable; that is,
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Figure 5: The percentage increase in payo®s for Green workers of a policy that enforces perfect
integration.
We observe that I is negative for all values of ®. So for the chosen parameters the integration
policy is never preferred. People are better o® segregated.
Our results are very clear; a second best policy involves a \laissez-faire" policy, such that
society becomes segregated. The intuition behind this result is twofold. First, in the case of
partial segregation the equilibrium is determined by the Green workers. They trade o® a bene¯t
in wage against a loss in employment. Their individual incentives therefore already put a limit
on the amount of wage inequality that can be sustained in equilibrium. Second, an integration
policy would lead to lower employment rates. In a society with risk-averse individuals, society
puts large emphasis on unemployment, and therefore prefers to allow for some inequality in
order to obtain these higher employment rates.
We ¯nally remark that an integration policy is only bene¯cial when society has additional
distributional concerns that are not captured by the concavity of the individual utility function.
For example, consider the case of a maximin social welfare function: Wmin = mini ¦i. In the
integrated case, ¹R = ¹G = ¹S, everyone obtains the same payo®, whereas in the segregated case
workers from group G are worse o®. Therefore, Wmin(1;¹¤) = ¦G
B(1;¹¤) and Wmin(¹S;¹S) =
¦G
B(¹S;¹S). We show a comparison of these two payo®s, ¦G
B(¹S;¹S)=¦G
B(1;¹¤)¡1, in Figure 5.
We observe that the Green workers would bene¯t from an integration policy for values of ®
around ^ ®, where the wage gap is particularly large. In such a case, strong distributional concerns
29would justify integration.
6 Summary and conclusions
We have investigated a simple social network framework where jobs are obtained through a
network of contacts formed stochastically, after career decisions had been made. We have es-
tablished that even with a very small amount of homophily within each social group, stable
occupational segregation equilibria will arise. If the wage di®erential across the occupations is
not too large, complete segregation will always be sustainable. If the wage di®erential is large,
complete segregation cannot be sustained, but a partial segregation equilibrium in which one of
the group fully specializes in one education while the other group mixes over the career tracks,
is sustainable. Furthermore, our model is able to explain sustained unemployment and wage
di®erences between the social groups.
We also analyze the implications of our model from a social planner's point of view. In the
¯rst best social welfare optimum, we ¯nd that segregation is the socially preferred outcome.
Subject to proper calibration of our model parameters, a second best social welfare analysis
supports a laissez-faire policy, where society also becomes segregated, shaped by individual
incentives. Both these conclusions are valid in light of 'reasonable' concavity features of the
individual utility function. Our social welfare conclusions cast some doubts on an "always
integration" policy choice; if job referrals through contact networks are relevant in matching
workers to vacancies, and if the mechanisms of our model are the correct ones, an integration
approach would only be justi¯ed under strong additional distributional concerns, not re°ected
in the individual utility functions.
We assumed that individuals ¯rst choose an education, and then form a network of job
contacts. As a consequence, individuals have to make expectations about the network they
could form, and base their education decisions on these expectations. This is in contrast to
earlier work on the role of networks in the labor market. In former research, the network was
supposed to be already in place, or the network was formed in the ¯rst stage (Montgomery 1991,
Calv¶ o-Armengol 2004, Calv¶ o-Armengol and Jackson 2004).
Our departure from the earlier frameworks raises questions about the assumed timing of the
education choice. Are crucial career decisions made before or after job contacts are formed?
One might be tempted to answer: both. Of course everyone is born with family ties, and
in early school and in the neighborhood children form more ties. It is also known that peer-
group pressure among children has a strong e®ect on decisions to, for instance, smoke or engage
in criminal activities and, no doubt, family and early friends do form a non-negligible source
30of in°uence when making crucial career decisions. However, we argue that most job-relevant
contacts (the so called 'instrumental ties') are made later, for instance at the university, or
early at the workplace, hence after a specialized career track had been chosen. In spite of the
fact that those ties are typically not as strong as family ties, they are more likely to provide
relevant information on vacancies to job seekers; Granovetter (1973, 1985) provides convincing
evidence that job seekers more often receive crucial job information from acquaintances ("weak
ties"), rather than from family or very close friends ("strong ties"). If the vast majority of such
instrumental ties are formed after the individual embarked on a (irreversible) career, then it is
justi¯ed to consider a model in which the job contact network is formed after making a career
choice.
While our social interaction model can describe empirical patterns of occupational segre-
gation and wage inequality between gender, racial or ethnical groups, other factors are also
documented to play a signi¯cant role in this context. This model should thus be seen as com-
plement to alternatives, such as taste discrimination or rational bias by employers, which are
still present in the market despite their (predicted) erosion over time, due to both competitive
pressure and institutional instruments. It is therefore pertinent to directly investigate in future
research how relevant are the mechanisms described in this paper and to assess their relative
strength in explaining observed occupational segregation, vis-µ a-vis other proposed theories.
Our model easily allows for interesting extensions. One avenue for future research is to
extend our framework to issues such as the position of minority versus majority groups, by
modeling the interaction between social groups of unequal sizes. Another avenue is to consider
heterogeneity in productivity. This would allow us to analyze the mismatch of workers to ¯rms
due to network e®ects. We intend to pursue these lines of research in the future.
31A Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 uses the following lemma:




R < 1 and 0 < ¹¤
G < 1, does not exist.
Proof. Suppose (¹¤
R;¹¤
G) is a stable equilibrium, and ¹¤
R 2 (0;1) and ¹¤




































































which contradicts (19). The same reasoning holds for ¹¤
R < ¹¤







G cannot be a stable equilibrium. To see this, suppose that
(¹¤;¹¤) with ¹¤ 2 (0;1) is a stable equilibrium. Hence ¦X
A(¹¤;¹¤) = ¦X
B(¹¤;¹¤) for X 2 fR;Gg
and @¢¦X
@¹X < 0 at ¹R = ¹G = ¹¤, and det(G(¹¤;¹¤) > 0, where G(¹) = D¢¦(¹) is the Jacobian
of ¢¦ ´ (¢¦R;¢¦G) with respect to ¹ ´ (¹R;¹G).














































for X;Y 2 fR;Gg, X 6= Y . But then it is straightforward to see that det(G(¹¤;¹¤)) < 0. This
contradicts stability.






Hence, (¹R;¹G) = (1;0) is clearly a stable equilibrium. The same is true for (¹R;¹G) = (0;1).
Lemma 1 and Assumption 2 ensure that these are the only two equilibria.




Furthermore, from Assumption 1 we know that
@¢¦G(1;¹G)
@¹G < 0 for all ¹G 2 [0;1]. It follows















It is therefore clear that (¹R;¹G) = (1;¹¤) is a stable equilibrium. The same is true for
(¹R;¹G) = (¹¤;1).
To show that there is no other equilibrium, note that by (11) ¦R
A(1;0) > ¦R
B(1;0): Assump-
tion 2 then implies that ¦R
A(¹;0) > ¦R
B(¹;0) for all ¹ 2 [0;1]. Hence, (¹;0) and, similarly, (0;¹)
cannot be an equilibrium. By Lemma 1 we also know that there is no mixed equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. The equations follow almost directly. We have
sR
A(1;0) = sG
B(1;0) = sH > sL = sR
B(1;0) = sG
A(1;0):






and this is equivalent to (12).





In the proof of Proposition 1, equation (25), we already demonstrated the inequality (14) Further,
by Assumption 2 we know that ¢¦G(1;¹G) is strictly monotonically decreasing in ¹G.
(i) If ^ ¹ < ¸
2(p+·+¸), then sG
A(1; ^ ¹) < sG
B(1; ^ ¹). As wA(1; ^ ¹) = wB(1; ^ ¹) it must be that
¦G
A(1; ^ ¹) < ¦G
B(1; ^ ¹):
But then it also must be that ¹¤ < ^ ¹. As we consider a partial equilibrium, we know that
¹¤ > 0. Hence, 0 < ¹¤ < ^ ¹ and wA(1; ^ ¹¤) > wB(1; ^ ¹¤), as wA(¹R;¹G) is a decreasing function,
whereas wB(¹R;¹G) is increasing.
(ii) If ^ ¹ > ¸
2(p+·+¸), then sG
A(1; ^ ¹) > sG
B(1; ^ ¹) and ¦G
A(1; ^ ¹) < ¦G
B(1; ^ ¹): But then ¹¤ > ^ ¹. By
Assumption 1 we know that ¹¤ < 1. Hence, ^ ¹ < ¹¤ < 1, and therefore wA(1; ^ ¹¤) < wB(1; ^ ¹¤)
We next continue with the proof of Proposition 4. This proof uses the following lemma:


















(¹R;¹G) < 0: (28)








































































With the de¯nition of sX












= s((p + ·)¹ ¹ + ¸¹X=2) +
¹X¸
2
s0 ((p + ·)¹ ¹ + ¸¹X=2) (34)
when X 6= Y . Therefore ¹X > ¹Y is equivalent to (33), whenever (34) is strictly monotone
increasing with ¹X, where we can treat ¹ ¹ = (¹X +¹Y )=2 as a constant. It is easy to check that
this is indeed the case under condition (26). We conclude that hypothesis (27) holds whenever
¹X > ¹Y . With a similar derivation one can show that condition (26) implies (28) as well.
















































Taking the second derivatives of sX
A, evaluating at ¹R = ¹G = ¹ and reordering, we get that
(29) is equivalent to
s00((p + · + ¸)¹=2) < ¡
4
¸¹
s0((p + · + ¸)¹=2): (37)
Inequality (37) clearly holds if condition (26) holds, which proves (29). In a similar fashion, (26)
implies (30)
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that W(¹R;¹G) is maximized at (¹R;¹G) = (~ ¹R; ~ ¹G), where




W(¹R;¹G) s.t. LA(¹R;¹G) = cLB(¹R;¹G): (38)
35Because by de¯nition of c, the solution (~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) satis¯es the restriction
g(¹R;¹G) = cLB(¹R;¹G) ¡ LA(¹R;¹G) = 0; (39)
it actually solves the maximization problem (38).
De¯ne the feasible set C = f¹R 2 [0;1];¹G 2 [0;1]jg(¹R;¹G) = 0g. By the assumption of
constant returns to scale, we have that for all (¹R;¹G) 2 C: wA(¹R;¹G) and wB(¹R;¹G) are
constant, and therefore, at all (¹R;¹G) 2 C, the welfare function (16) can be written as
W(¹R;¹G) = LA(¹R;¹G)(U(wA) + U(wB)=c);




LA(¹R;¹G) s.t. LA(¹R;¹G) = cLB(¹R;¹G): (40)
We verify that (~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) indeed satisfy the ¯rst- and second-order conditions of problem (40).
The Lagrangian is given by
L(¹R;¹G;Ã) = (1 ¡ Ã)LA(¹R;¹G) + ÃcLB(¹R;¹G):
Since (~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) is supposed to be interior, the following ¯rst order constraints should hold:
@L
@¹R
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G;Ã) = (1 ¡ Ã)
@LA
@¹R
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) + Ã
@LB
@¹R
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) = 0 (41)
@L
@¹G
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G;Ã) = (1 ¡ Ã)
@LA
@¹G
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) + Ã
@LB
@¹G
(~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) = 0: (42)
The ¯rst part of Lemma 2 implies that Ã 2 (0;1) and that under condition (26): ¹R > ¹G if
and only if @L=@¹R > @L=@¹G. Therefore, condition (26) and the ¯rst-order conditions imply
that ~ ¹R = ~ ¹G ´ ~ ¹.
Since ~ ¹R = ~ ¹G de¯nes a unique point in C, the second-order condition should hold at
~ ¹R = ~ ¹G, which says that the Hessian of the Lagrangian with respect to (¹R;¹G) evaluated at
the social optimum, D2
¹R;¹GL(~ ¹; ~ ¹;Ã), is negative de¯nite on the subspace fzR;zGjzR(@g=@¹R)+


















(@¹R)2 > 0: (43)
Because
@g
@¹R(~ ¹; ~ ¹) =
@g
@¹G(~ ¹; ~ ¹); and @2L
(@¹G)2(~ ¹; ~ ¹) = @2L
(@¹R)2(~ ¹; ~ ¹); the second order condition (43)
simpli¯es to @2L
@¹R@¹G(~ ¹; ~ ¹) > @2L




(~ ¹; ~ ¹) + Ã
@2LB
@¹R@¹G
(~ ¹; ~ ¹) > (1 ¡ Ã)
@2LA
(@¹R)2(~ ¹; ~ ¹) + Ã
@2LB
(@¹R)2(~ ¹; ~ ¹): (44)
36By the second part of Lemma 2, inequality (44) cannot hold under condition (26). Therefore we
have a contradiction and the non-segregation allocation (~ ¹R; ~ ¹G) cannot be a social optimum.
Since a social optimum exists by continuity of W and compactness of [0;1]2, the social optimum
necessarily has to involve complete or partial segregation.
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